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CONCEPTUALIZING PROOF AND
CALCULATING PROBABILITIES: A
RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR KAYE
Neil B. Cohent
I
In Apples and Oranges: Confidence Coefficients and the Burden of Persuasion,I Professor David Kaye has, as usual, presented thought-provoking arguments in a field of increasing interest. His Article is an
important contribution to the debate, although, as this Article explores, I disagree with his conclusions.
A.

Confidence in Probability

Professor Kaye's Article is primarily a critical analysis of ideas
that I initially presented in Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge. 2 In that piece I observed that
current probabilistic models of proof fail to account satisfactorily for
discrepancies between their results and those that the legal system
regularly reaches. The proponents of those models (including, but
not limited to, Professor Kaye) have often either denied the discrepancies 3 or explained them as the result of policies in the legal system
that compete with accuracy in factfinding. 4 I argued, however, that
the discrepancies are real and result not from the presence of external policies in the system (though, of course, such policies are present), but rather from a misperception on the part of the models'
proponents as to the nature of probabilities determined by legal
factfinders.
In particular, I argued that the proponents and their models fail
t
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to recognize that the legal system can only estimate probabilities,
rather than determine them with exactitude, and that the implications of this observation require a rethinking of probabilistic formulations of burdens of persuasion. Accordingly, I suggested that we
(1) borrow by analogy from the field of statistics the concept of
"confidence intervals" or "interval estimates," (2) recognize that
conceiving of our estimated probabilities as intervals is more informative than concentrating solely on best guesses, or "point estimates" of the probabilities, and, finally, (3) deem the burden of
persuasion satisfied only when the ,entire confidence interval or interval estimate (rather than just the point estimate) of the
probability in question exceeds the relevant threshold.
As an illustration, I presented the hypothetical (and easily quantifiable) case of High-Tech Supply Co. v. Hacker, an action for the price
of a microchip lost in transit, in which the burden was on the plaintiff-seller to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the
merchantability of the chip.5 The only evidence available to either
party was that the chip in question had been selected randomly from
a vat containing thousands of chips. Previously, a sample of one
hundred chips from the vat had been tested and fifty-one of them
were merchantable. Based on this evidence, the best guess, or
"point estimate," of the proportion of merchantable chips in the vat
and, therefore, of the probability that the chip in question was merchantable, would be 0.51.
I argued, however, that although the point estimate of the relevant probability exceeded 0.5, the plaintiff-seller should lose. 6 The
point estimate is just that-an estimate. Even though a majority of
the sampled chips were merchantable, it is not necessarily the case
that a majority of the chips in the entire vat were merchantable. Yet,
it is only if a majority of the chips in the vat were merchantable that
it is more likely than not that the particular chip in question was
merchantable. Constructing a confidence interval around the point
estimate enables us to take into account the nature of the sample in
making a judgment as to the entire vat. More specifically, the confidence interval provides additional information enabling us to decide
whether to reject the hypothesis that less than a majority of chips
were merchantable (and, therefore, the probability that the chip in
question was merchantable is equal to or less than 0.5). If that hypothesis is rejected, the alternative-a majority of the chips in question were merchantable (and, therefore, the probability that the chip
in question was merchantable exceeds 0.5)-can be accepted and
the plaintiff-seller wins the case.
5
6

Cohen, supra note 2, at 405-06.
Id. at 406.
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Based on the information from sampling one hundred chips,
however, only values below 0.428 could be eliminated as the proportion of merchantable chips in the vat. 7 Therefore, under my theory, the plaintiff-seller has not met its burden of convincing the
factfinder by the preponderance of the evidence of the truth of the
probandum.
B.

Kaye's Critique

It is clear that Professor Kaye disagrees in some way with the
theory presented in Confidence in Probability,but the nature of his disagreement is less clear. Although early in his critique he describes
the underlying idea of Confidence in Probability as "incoherent" 8 and
an "unholy union,"9 much of the remainder of his piece proceeds to
cast doubt whether Kaye actually challenges my basic thesis. Indeed, Part II of Kaye's article consists largely of a rearticulation of
my concept of using interval estimates,1 0 which Kaye in his articulation apparently finds acceptable, and of a detailed exposition as to
determining the appropriate balance between (1) the risk of incorrectly determining that the burden of persuasion has been met (a
"false alarm") and (2) the risk of incorrectly determining that the
burden of persuasion has not been met (a "miss"). 1 This portion
of his paper, although disagreeing with the balance of error risks I
advocated, again implicitly accepts the underlying theory of Confidence in Probability.
Kaye's schizophrenia concerning my theory makes a response
difficult. To the extent that he finds the underlying concept acceptable when articulated more consistently with orthodox statistical nomenclature, I am tempted simply to accept his refinements and
move on to further applications. 12 I fear, however, that a significant
part of his criticism is directed at a misperception of the issue that I
addressed in Confidence in Probability. Accordingly, I undertake the
following more detailed response.

7
This calculation assumes the use of a one-tailed confidence interval at the 95%
confidence level. See id. Of course, there is nothing sacred about that particular confidence level, and I use it here only as an example. See id. at 413-17.
8 Kaye, supra note 1, at 57.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 64-65.
11 Id. at 66-73.
12
See, e.g., Cohen, Taking FactindingAway from Factftnders: A ProbabilisticPerspective
(n.d.) (work in progress).
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II

A.

Areas of Agreement

It is perhaps easiest to start by observing that there are large
areas about which Kaye and I agree. This is no accident; one of my
original purposes in writing Confidence in Probability was to rebut arguments that the use, as advocated by Kaye and others, of probabilistic methods in the proof process was improper or invalid. I believe
that such methods, including probabilistic interpretations of the
burden of persuasion, are essentially valid.
Kaye and I both believe that one can speak meaningfully of a
probability that a particular event or series of events occurred. We
agree, too, that standard probability axioms apply to the determination of that probability. We also agree that the burden of persuasion can be expressed as a probability threshold, i.e., that the
burden of persuasion is satisfied when the probability that the probandum occurred exceeds a particular number. Further, we agree
that for civil cases governed by the preponderance of the evidence
standard the probability threshold is 0.5. We disagree, on the other
hand, over subtle but important points in the context of legal proof
as to the significance of the amount of information available in making a probability determination, the effect of varying amounts of
information on the precision of that determination, and the relevance of the precision.
In recent years, however, the very idea of using probabilistic
methods to analyze the proof process has come under attack by
commentators who seem to suggest that, although the logic of
mathematical methods works in virtually every other human endeavor, it somehow is inapplicable in the special world of law. 13 I
believe that these attacks, although valuable stimuli, are fundamentally flawed; they correctly observe certain inadequacies in the traditional application of probabilistic methods of proof, but wrongly
conclude from those observations that the methods cannot be applied at all. Demonstrating the error of this argument against standard mathematical logic was one of my goals in Confidence in
Probability. It is simply not the case that otherwise valid mathematical principles fail to work in the legal environment; rather, the principles will work so long as the problem to which they are applied is
properly defined. An analogy to very simple mathematical issues is
instructive. Typically, school children first learn the principles of
arithmetic in the abstract and then develop the ability to apply these
principles to actual situations by the use of so-called "story
13

See generally, L.

COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE

MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF EVIDENCE

(1976).

(1977); G. SHAFER, A
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problems." Often, a child will solve a story problem incorrectly despite having done every arithmetic calculation correctly. The reason
for the wrong answer is not that arithmetic does not work in the
context of the problem; the reason, of course, is that the child did
not properly understand the problem. Had the child understood
the problem, he or she would have made different calculations. The
conceptualizing of the problem, not the arithmetic, failed.
Similarly, I believe that the inadequacies identified by the critics
of probabilistic analysis result not from problems in the mathematics, but in the conceptualization of the legal issue. My point in writing Confidence in Probability was to demonstrate that many of the
objections raised by those who attack probabilistic interpretations of
proof could be alleviated by recognizing and accommodating the
imprecise nature of those interpretations.
Thus, in my efforts to defend the foundations of probabilistic
analysis of the proof process, I sought to refine its premises. In so
doing I phrased my argument largely in somewhat formal, although
simple, mathematical terms. An unintended side effect of that
choice of writing style was to lead Kaye to devote his attention to my
articulation of the mathematical points, rather than the underlying
conceptualization of factfinding. Unfortunately this side effect has
obscured the areas of substantive agreement and disagreement that
Kaye and I have.
I believe that Kaye and I differ less over how to calculate than
over what to calculate. The difference is too important to lose underneath a welter of mathematical hairsplitting. In order to explore
my point more completely, and to identify its divergences from
Kaye's largely implicit view of the nature of legal proof, let us examine closely the legal system's approach to choice under
uncertainty.
B.

A Model of Legal Proof

Simply stated, my model of legal proof stresses the importance
of taking into account the amount of information utilized in determining the probability estimate. To illustrate the importance of this
factor, let us imagine that favorite construct of probability teachers-a gambling machine. This machine, when played, displays a
picture of either an apple or an orange; the machine is set to pick
randomly the picture to be displayed based on an apples-to-oranges
ratio that is programmed into the machine but unknown to the players. The ratio itself is also randomly determined. A player is allowed to watch a number of plays on the machine, and then the
player must determine the probability that the next play will result
in an apple being displayed. Assume that there is one player on
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each of three different machines. Player A is allowed to watch three
plays, two of which result in apples; she, naturally, picks 2/3 as the
probability of an apple appearing next on her machine. -Player B is
allowed to observe thirty plays, twenty of which result in apples; she,
also, picks 2/3 as the probability of an apple appearing next on her
machine. Finally, Player C is allowed to observe 30,000 plays,
20,000 of which result in apples; not surprisingly, she, too, picks 2/3
as the appropriate probability for her machine.
Each player has chosen 2/3 as the probability for her machine,
and we would all agree that that choice is the best one in each case
given the limited information available. We would not be surprised
at all, however, if the secretly programmed probability for machine
A were actually quite a bit different from 2/3, but we would be surprised if the secret ratio for machine C were distant from 2/3. Indeed, although it would not surprise us if the secret ratio for
machine A were actually less than 1/2, it would surprise us greatly if
the secret ratio for machine C were less than 1/2. Thus, the
probability of 2/3 for machine A connotes something very different
than does the probability of 2/3 for machine C. The model that
Kaye has previously advocated, by contrast, treats all three
probabilities the same.
For the sake of this argument, let us take the gambling-machine
situation one step further. Imagine that after observing the plays on
her gambling machine, each player bets against the house that the
next play will result in a picture of an apple. Unfortunately, the
lights in the room containing the machines fail at the exact moment
that those next pictures appear; by the time the lights return, the
pictures are absent from the screens. Although no one has seen the
crucial pictures, each player is of course confident that her machine
showed an apple. Accordingly, when the house declines to pay the
players for their alleged winning bet, the players bring suit to recover their claimed winnings.
Assume that the parties to each suit stipulate (1) that the
programmed ratio of apples to oranges for the relevant machine was
unknown to both parties, (2) that that ratio was randomly selected,
and (3) that the results of the plays observed before the bet and the
light failure were as detailed above. Assume further that the lack of
additional evidence does not itself create a spoliation-like inference
against either party. As we know, based on the information available, we would estimate for each machine a probability of '-V that
the unobserved picture was an apple. 14
14
Of course, as Kaye would correctly point out, the probability is actually a parameter-the secret ratio. We do not know the secret ratio, however; all we can do is estimate it from the information available.
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Under the Kaye model, we would simply note, in this case of
'justifiably naked statistical evidence,"' 5 that 2/3 is greater than 1/2,
and conclude that each plaintiff has therefore satisfied her burden of
persuasion. Thus, despite the sharply differing implications of the
varied observations of the three machines, the probabilities in all
three cases would be treated as if they were identical. Kaye evidently belongs to the Gertrude Stein school of probability: he believes that a probability is a probability is a probability.
Under my model, on the other hand, we would award a verdict
to Player C (20,000 out of 30,000 apples), but not to Player A (two
apples in three plays). We might also find for Player B (twenty apples in thirty plays), but with less comfort than we feel in finding for
Player C. The reason springs from the observation noted above,
that we are more secure in believing that the programmed proportion of apples for Player C's machine is greater than 0.5 than we are
that the relevant proportion exceeds 0.5 for the other players'
machines.
The difference between Kaye's view and mine arises, I believe,
from differences in our concepts of the factfinding process. My concept, apparently unlike Kaye's, incorporates an awareness of two different types of error to which the process is subject. To illustrate
my concept, let us imagine a very simple legal dispute. The parties
agree on all facts but one. Plaintiff alleges that event X occurred,
while defendant alleges that it did not. If X did occur, plaintiff will
be entitled to a remedy; if X did not occur, plaintiff will not be so
entitled. According to the legal rules governing this dispute, the
burden of persuasion is on plaintiff. Plaintiff will prevail if the
factfinder determines that plaintiff has demonstrated X by the preponderance of the evidence.
How should the legal system determine whether to give a remedy to plaintiff? We must address this question, which looks to the
heart of the factfinding process, before we can appropriately consider competing theories of probabilistic analysis. The question can
best be answered after a close analysis of the explicit and implicit
steps that constitute legal factfinding.
First, we must recognize that even after all the evidence is
presented the factfinder will not (except very rarely) know whether X
occurred; some doubt will nearly always linger concerning a witness's veracity or accuracy, the trustworthiness of a confession, or
something else. At best, the factfinder can seek to determine the
probability that X occurred.
15
See Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderanceof the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked
Statistical Evidence and M1ultiple Causation, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 487.
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Second, even though the factfinder cannot be certain whether X
occurred, and can only assign a probability to that event, the legal
system allows a factfinder to give a remedy to plaintiff in certain
cases. Were the legal system to require certainty before awarding a
verdict to the party bearing the burden of persuasion, that party
could almost never prevail. In the simple hypothetical at hand, the
factfinder may give a remedy to plaintiff upon finding it more likely
than not that X occurred. In probabilistic terms, we say that the
factfinder may find for plaintiff if it finds that the probability of X is
greater than 0.5.
Third, the system's willingness to give plaintiff a verdict even
though the factfinder does not know that X occurred carries the risk
of two kinds of error. First, even though the factfinder determines
that X more likely than not occurred, X may not, in fact, have occurred. For convenience, let us refer to this first kind of possible
error as "fact error." We are willing to accept the risk of fact error
because the alternative (i.e., giving a verdict to defendant even when
the factfinder believes that the probability that X occurred exceeds
0.5) is worse. If, indeed, X more likely than not occurred, in the
long run of similar cases fewer errors will be made if the system
awards the verdict to plaintiff than if it awards it to defendant.
A second risk of error is also present: although the factfinder's
best single guess based on the evidence presented (E) is that X more
likely than not occurred, it is possible if the totality of all available
evidence (T)16 had been presented 17 that the factfinder's best guess
would be that it is actually less likely than not that X occurred. Symbolically, while Pr(X) IE is greater than 0.5, Pr(X) I T may be less
than 0.5.18 Recall, for example, that after three plays of the applesand-oranges machine, player A determined that the next picture displayed was more likely than not to be an apple. Yet, it is quite possible that additional observed plays would have convinced player A
that an apple was, in fact, less likely than not to be next. For convenience, let us refer to this second kind of possible error as
"probability error."
I believe that, although we are willing to accept the risk of fact
16 Save, of course, for that excluded or excludable under the applicable rules of
evidence.
17
We assume here that the party's failure to present that information does not
support any spoliation-like inference. In other words, to borrow Kaye's terminology, the
evidence is "justifiably naked." See Kaye, supra note 15.
18
In this context, Pr(X) IE means "the probability of X given the evidence
presented." Pr(X) IT means "the probability of X given all conceivable relevant evidence." The symbols are Kaye's. See Kaye, Do We Need a Calculus of Weight to Understand
Proofbeyond a Reasonable Doubt?, 66 B.U.L. REV.657, 662-63 n. 15 (1986). See also Cohen,
The Costs of Acceptability: Blue Buses, Agent Orange, and Aversion to Statistical Evidence, 66
B.U.L. REV. 563, 568 n.28 (1986).
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error, we are less willing to accept the risk of probability error. If
probability error occurs, the factfinder will give plaintiff a remedy
even though X is less likely than not to have occurred. If it is less
likely than not that X occurred, then in the long run of similar cases
more errors would be made if the verdict were given to plaintiff than
if it were given to defendant.
Our aversion to making probability error causes us to be conservative in determining that X more likely than not occurred. We
recognize that while there are some cases in which a factfinder's determination, based on available evidence, that the probability of X is
greater than 0.5 would probably not be changed by the presentation
of additional evidence, there are other cases in which the factfinder's
determination, based on the available evidence, that the probability
of X exceeds 0.5 might well change with the presentation of additional evidence. Accordingly, before we make a legal finding that X
occurred, we seek to be convinced that, in fact, X more likely than not
occurred.
Convincing the factfinder of such a probabilistic judgment requires more, I believe, than simply noting that the best guess of the
probability exceeds 0.5; rather, I believe, the factfinder also takes
into account its judgment as to how likely the best guess is to "hold
20
up." 19 Professor Kaye, however, seems to reject this view.
C.

Differences from Kaye

Given the foregoing differences in our views of legal factfinding, it becomes apparent that the crux of the difference between
Professor Kaye's view of burdens of persuasion and my own is not
statistical but conceptual-the difference results from our differing
views of legal decisionmaking. The gulf between us is narrower
than Kaye seems to believe, but deeper than the differences he
raises.
Professor Kaye's article does not address our underlying conceptual differences. Instead, he focuses on statistical methods with
which, for the most part, I have no dispute. Again, our disagreement
concerns not the mechanics of statistical determination, but rather
the nature of what must be determined.
In attacking my theory, Professor Kaye mischaracterizes it, as
well as the legal context in which it resides. He mistakenly attrib19
The risk of nonpersuasion as to probability error falls on the same party bearing
the risk of nonpersuasion as to fact error. In our prototypical example, both risks fall on
plaintiff- this is appropriate inasmuch as it is plaintiff who is seeking to have the legal
system disturb the status quo.
20 But see Kaye, supra note 18, at 667 n.22 (suggesting possibility of accounting for
completeness of evidence by means of second-order probability).
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utes to me an intent to "overthrow" accepted probabilistic formulations of the burden of persuasion, 21 and in explicating that point he
distorts both my views and the "reigning theory." 2 2 In particular,
Kaye identifies Bayesian decision theory as the reigning theory of
probabilistic
legal decisionmaking, and calls my own ideas as a
"graft" 23 onto that theory which is "incoherent." 24 It is incoherent,
according to Kaye, because it "marries the frequentist's confidence
' 25
coefficient with a subjectivist's posterior probability.
To begin with, Kaye's description of Bayesian inference as the
"reigning" view is novel; as recently as 1982, Kaye stated that Baye26
sian inference is "not used as widely as the classical theories."
More important, in making his assertions, Kaye unwarrantedly appropriates exclusively for the Bayesian view important concepts that
in fact are common to any system of decisionmaking based on probabilistic information. Most important among these concepts are
(1) determination by the factfinder of a probability that the probandum is true, and (2) a threshold number that the probability
must exceed in order for the party bearing the burden of persuasion
to win his or her case. 2 7 This appropriation is either trivial-defining all probabilistic legal decisionmaking schemes as Bayesian-or
just another salvo in the long-running war of words between many
"frequentists" and "Bayesians." In either event, of course, the label
Kaye chooses to give any aspect of the decisionmaking process cannot, by itself, have any effect on its validity or usefulness.
Kaye's somewhat apocalyptic description notwithstanding, my
thesis, again, is simply that our analysis of factfinding ought to take
into account that the factfinder's determination of the probability in
question is only an estimate, like any other determination made on
the basis of sample data. Recognizing this feature of factfinding in
no way alters the status of the estimated probability as a "posterior
probability" unless one adopts an unduly narrow definition of that
term.
Furthermore, the suggestion that it is wrong to use frequencybased concepts in the context of determining subjective probabilities is curious coming from Professor Kaye. Kaye himself has recog21

Kaye, supra note I,at 54.
Id.
23
Id. at 57.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Kaye, The Numbers Game: StatisticalInference in Discrimination Cases (Book Review),
80 MicH. L. REv. 833, 853 (1982). In all fairness, Kaye did at that time also state that
Bayesian inference was becoming "increasingly influential." Id. Perhaps the mid-1980s
have witnessed the ascendancy to pre-eminence of Bayesian inference.
27 Kaye, supra note 1, at 57.
22
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nized the essential equivalence of subjective and frequency-based
probabilities by using the two interchangeably, 28 and appropriately
so, for, as has long been demonstrated, subjective probabilities obey
all the rules of frequency probabilities. 2 9 Moreover, it is difficult to
imagine how subjective probabilities can be understood as anything
30
other than direct analogies to frequency probabilities.
The important difference in reasoning between Professor Kaye
and myself, then, is not statistical but conceptual. We differ not on
the mathematics of determining probabilities but on the nature of
that which is determined. Kaye's almost exclusive attention to the
process of calculating probabilities obscures, I believe, the proper
focus of analysis: the nature of legal proof and the reasons for deciding, in a world of incomplete knowledge, that a fact is "proven."
III
A.

The Contrasting Concepts at Work

Perhaps the difference may best be illustrated by a choice between two gambling analogies.
Imagine the following variation on the apples-and-oranges
3
gamble described earlier. An opaque vat contains a large number
of balls, each of which is either black or white. The percentages of
each color ball in the vat are not known, however. A number of
balls is randomly drawn from the vat and shown to the contestant.
The contestant is then given the choice of betting, at even odds, on
the color of each ball remaining in the vat.
If twenty balls were drawn from the vat, eighteen of which were
white, the contestant's choice is an easy one: bet white. Although
the ultimate percentage of white balls in the entire vat may not, in
fact, be 90% (eighteen out of twenty), it would be surprising if the
28
29

See Kaye, supra note 3, at 604.
See L. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (1st ed. 1954); see also Tribe, supra

note 3, at 1346-49 (1971).
30
Even though the events to which one assigns subjective probabilities are typically
unique (and, therefore, not describable by relative frequencies), at the very least a subjective probability of, for example, one-third conveys the belief that, on the average, one
out of three events with that probability will occur.
Kaye also states that the "perceived dissonance" I identify springs from a failure to
appreciate the "often overlooked distinction between justified and unjustified naked statistical evidence." Kaye, supra note 1, at 56. Kaye, however, fails to appreciate that my
conception (as well, one hopes, as all competing conceptions) of burdens of persuasion
extends beyond cases in which the evidence is "statistical," be it naked or clothed. The
conception applies without regard to the type of evidence. The fact that quantifiable
examples are easy to create and understand should not be allowed to obscure this point.
In this light, Kaye's "distinction" amounts to no more than the commonplace (and,
by now, unremarkable) observation that sometimes lack of evidence will itself be evidence against the party who could have been expected to produce it.
31
Any number large enough to avoid hypergeometric distortion will do.
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percentage were less than 50%. This is important, because so long
as the percentage of white balls is greater than 50%, betting on
white will, in the long run of the entire vat, result in more wins than
losses. Thus, a rational contestant would likely bet on white in this
case.
Similarly, if ten balls were drawn from the vat, and all ten were
black, then the rational contestant would almost certainly bet black
for each remaining ball. Although there may well be a substantial
proportion of white balls in the vat, it would be surprising, given the
random selection of ten black balls, if the white balls outnumbered
the black balls.
Now if 10,000 balls were drawn from the vat, and 5,500 were
white, the contestant might pause a bit longer to think before placing his bet. Only 55% of the drawn balls are white; that is a smaller
percentage than that relied on in the previous bets. Yet, on reflection, given the large number of drawn balls, it is unlikely that less
than a majority of the balls are white. So long as a majority are
white, the contestant will win by betting white. Therefore, the contestant will, most likely, bet white. Similarly, a contestant would
likely rely on even narrower percentages so long as the sample size
is correspondingly larger. If 1,000,000 balls were drawn from the
vat, and 510,000 were white, the contestant would still likely bet
white. Although only 51% of the drawn balls were white, it would
be surprising, given the large number of drawn balls, if less than a
majority were white.
0
Not all cases will be so easy, however. For example, what if
three balls are drawn, two of which are black? Or what if five balls
are drawn, three of which are white? If the stakes are non-trivial, the
contestant is now in a bit of a quandary. In the second drawing, for
example, a majority of the balls drawn were white; yet a bet that
each of the remaining balls is white carries significant risk. The contestant might still believe that white is the best bet, but it would not
surprise him if, in fact, a majority of the balls in the vat were black.
A random drawing from a vat with 55% black balls, for example,
could easily result in two white balls out of three balls drawn. In
effect, the contestant would be saying that although white is a better
bet than black, it would not be surprising to lose by betting white.
Most contestants would not choose to risk a substantial portion
of their life's savings on this last bet. Indeed, if contestants in the
game were given three options-(1) bet white, (2) bet black, or
(3) don't bet-it is fairly easy to predict the choice of most contestants in each of the examples described. In the first example, eighteen white balls out of twenty, most contestants would bet white. In
the second example, ten black balls out of ten, most contestants
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would bet black. In the third example (5,500 white balls out of
10,000) and fourth example (510,000 white balls out of 1,000,000),
most contestants would bet white. In the fifth example (two black
balls out of three) and sixth example (three white balls out of five),
however, most contestants would probably opt for choice number
three-don't bet.
Under my view of legal decisionmaking, all three choices, including "don't bet," are available to the factfinder. Under Kaye's
view, however, the contestant (i.e., factfinder) does not have choice
number three available-a bet must be made. This difference is important. In the first four examples, the contestant/factfinder would
willingly risk a significant amount of money on the proposition that
a particular color of ball is more likely to appear than is another. In
the last two examples, by contrast, the contestant/factfinder would
not willingly take that risk. To put it another way, in the first four
examples the factfinder is convinced that a particular color is more
likely than the other color; in the other two examples, the factfinder
is not convinced that either color is more likely than the other.
Under my view of legal factfinding, the party who has the burden of persuasion has the burden of convincing the factfinder to
make the bet on that party. If the factfinder instead would bet on
the other party, or choose not to bet, the burden has not been met. In
other words, I see three possible responses from the factfinder:
(1) bet on white, (2) bet on black, and (3) too close to call. If it is too
close to call, the party has not met its burden. Kaye's view, by contrast, forces the factfinder to announce a bet, even if it is one that
the factfinder would not voluntarily make and does not offer the
factfinder the option of declining the bet because it is too close to
call. 3 2 Kaye apparently believes that the world is very precise.
Let us translate this betting game back into the terms of the
prototypical litigation described earlier.3 3 "Bet white" is the
equivalent of concluding that X is more likely than not. "Bet black"
is the equivalent of concluding that X is less likely than not. "Don't
bet" is the equivalent of concluding that one cannot safely say either
that X is more likely than not or that X is less likely than not. Therefore, if the burden of persuasion is on the party seeking to prove X,
that burden is met only if choice 1-"bet white," or "X is more
likely than not"-is appropriate. On the oth~r hand, if the burden
of persuasion were on the party seeking to prove not-X, the burden
32
Of course, Kaye's theory does, in a narrow sense, allow all three choices, but it
allows the third choice-don't bet-only in the rare case of an exact tie. See Cohen,
supra note 2, at 418.
33
See supra pp. 84-86.

19871

RESPONSE TO KAYE

would be met only if choice 2-"bet black," or "X is less likely than
not"-were appropriate.
If choice 3-"don't bet," or "can't safely say whether X is more
or less likely than not"-is appropriate, neither party can win if he
bears the burden of persuasion. As I explained in Confidence in
Probability,34 this situation is the equivalent of equipoise. This expansive concept of equipoise fits more closely the importance given in
litigation to determining who bears the burden of persuasion than
does the narrower concept apparently favored by Kaye-that there
is equipoise only when the probability of X equals exactly 0.5. (Of
course, from the viewpoint of the party bearing the burden of persuasion, choices 2 and 3 are identical; that party loses if either of
those two choices are made.)
B.

The Burden of Persuasion

In order for the foregoing model of legal decisionmaking to be
usable, even heuristically, it must provide rules for determining the
circumstances in which each choice is appropriate. In choosing
these rules, we must remember that any decision rule will necessarily involve risks of error. For our purposes, we must consider two
kinds of risks. First, we must consider the risk that choice 1 will be
made (and, therefore, plaintiff wins) when the correct choice would
have been choice 2 or choice 3 (and, therefore, plaintiff loses). Second, we must consider the risk that choice 2 or 3 will be made
(plaintiff loses) when the correct choice would have been choice 1
(plaintiff wins). The first error is commonly known as Type I error
(false rejection of the null hypothesis), while the second error is
commonly known as Type II error (false failure to reject the null
hypothesis). Any decision rule that lessens the risk of Type I error
will increase the risk of Type II error, and vice versa.3 5 The decision
rule chosen should reflect the legal system's judgment as to the optimum balance between the two.
At this point my theory suggests using the concept of confidence intervals or interval estimates in making the appropriate
choice, because these intervals relate directly to the risk of Type I
error. To be precise, the risk of Type I error equals one minus the
confidence level. For example, let us assume that the risk of Type I
error in determining that the probability of X exceeds 0.5 (and,
therefore, that the plaintiff should win his or her case) is 5% (or
Cohen, supra note 2, at 418-19.
35 As pointed out in Confidence in Probability,the decision rule "plaintiff always loses"
will reduce the risk of Type I error to zero, but will then obviously entail a very high risk
of Type II error. Similarly, the decision rule "plaintiff always wins" will have a zero risk
of Type II error, but a high risk of Type I error. See Cohen, supra note 2, at 414.
34
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0.05).36 This is the equivalent of saying that if a confidence interval
reflecting a 95% confidence level (100% minus 5%) were drawn
around the point estimate of the probability, the entire interval
would exceed 0.5.
Accordingly, my theory utilizes confidence intervals, or interval
estimates, in determining which choice is appropriate. If the entire
interval estimate of the probability in question exceeds 0.5, choice 1
is appropriate. If the entire interval is below 0.5, choice 2 is appropriate. If the interval straddles 0.5, choice 3 is appropriate.
Refer back to the game with the apple and orange gambling
machine, for example.3 7 Player B observed thirty plays, twenty of
which resulted in apples; Player C observed 30,000 plays, 20,000 of
which resulted in apples. Both players, presumably, would choose
2/3 as the probability. Yet, if one asked Player B if she could comfortably eliminate 0.5 as the actual probability of apples, she would
probably answer no. Player C, on the other hand, if asked the same
question, would probably answer yes.
Player C's point estimate of 2/3 as the probability is obviously
more precise than Player B's point estimate of 2/3. Yet the two point
estimates themselves, being identical, do not convey this difference
in precision. More exactly, they do not convey the differences between the two estimates as to which other possible values of the
probability in question can or cannot be excluded as unlikely to
bring about the observed results. In other words, the point estimates do not communicate two players' differing risks of Type I error in excluding possible values in the neighborhood of the point
38
estimate.
A confidence interval or interval estimate, on the other hand,
integrates the point estimate with information about the risk of
Type I error associated with that point estimate. A confidence interval or interval estimate consists not of just one point, but rather of
the point estimate and a range of values surrounding it. The width
of the interval is determined by the degree of "confidence" required
and by the amount of data available.
Thus although both Player B's and Player C's point estimates of
the probability of an apple were 2/3, their interval estimates would
differ considerably. At a 95% confidence level, for example, B's interval estimate would be 0.498-0.835, while C's would be 0.66136 1 have picked this threshold because of its familiarity, not because of its inherent
correctness. I agree with Kaye that there is nothing sacred about the 0.05 signifinance
level. See Cohen, supra note 2, at 412.
37
See supra text accompanying note 22.
38
Cf D. BARNES & J. CONLEY, STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION 125 (1986)

("Every statistic hides something if it condenses a lot of information into a single
number.").
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0.672. It is, of course, possible that for B's machine, the "true
probability" is less than 0.498 or greater than 0.835. Similarly, for
C's machine, the true probability could be greater than 0.672 or less
than 0.661. The risk that a probability value outside these ranges
would yield observed results of twenty apples out of thirty (in B's
case) or of 20,000 apples out of 30,000 (in C's case) is the risk of
Type I error associated with the confidence interval.
As pointed out above, the risk of Type I error associated with
excluding values outside the confidence interval is equal to one minus the "confidence level" of the interval; for a 95% confidence interval, for example, the risk of Type I error is 0.05 (1 minus 0.95).
Now, recall that the preponderance of the evidence burden of persuasion can be stated probabilistically as the burden of demonstrating that the probability of the probandum exceeds 0.5. Of course,
this probability can only be estimated. For the sake of argument,
assume that our legal system is willing to accept only a 0.05 risk of
Type I error in making the estimate. Under these circumstances, we
would award a verdict to the plaintiff only if a 95%o confidence interval excluded all values under 0.5 for the probability of the probandum. Only then would the risk of Type I error be within the
acceptable range.
As I mentioned above, 39 Kaye is schizophrenic about the use of
confidence intervals. Early in his piece, 40 he is quite pejorative;
later, however, he rearticulates the theory in a way he finds acceptable. 41 His rearticulation does represent, in many cases, a more appropriate use of certain probabilistic terms of art, and further
debate on that matter would serve no good purpose.
C.

Optimizing Error Risks

I believe that the confidence interval analogy performs well as a
heuristic for the decisionmaking process. 4 2 To use it, however, a
factfinder must select a confidence level to use in constructing the
intervals. This necessarily involves balancing the risks of Type I and
Type II error in determining whether the probability exceeds 0.5.
In Confidence in Probability,I evaluated five possible ways that the relaSee supra text accompanying notes 9-12.
See Kaye, supra note 1, at 57-62.
41 Id. at 64-65.
42
The confidence-interval-based theory is weak, however, in an area that Kaye does
not mention. The reason for Kaye's silence, I believe, is that this is the same area in
which his theories and all "mathematicist" theories stumble. Most legal disputes involve
inherently unquantifiable evidence, consisting of shadings, inconsistent evidence, and
the like. Neither Kaye's calculus nor mine can produce a precise number (or numbers)
from such evidence that, when compared with a set standard, will tell us who should win
the case.
39
40
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tive risks of these errors could be optimized: (1) minimize Type I
error; (2) minimize Type II error; (3) set a, the risk of Type I error,
just below 0.5; (4) set [3, the risk of Type II error, just below 0.5; and
(5) set cc equal to 3. For reasons described in my article, I chose the
43
fifth alternative-equalizing the risk of Type I and Type II errors.
Professor Kaye believes that my choice is wrong; he would, instead, opt to minimize the sum of Type I and Type II errors, a theory
he labels 8 MAP. 4 4 His theory is appealing, and ought to have been
addressed in Confidence in Probability.4 5 I do not, however, believe it
is necessarily correct or desirable in all cases. In evaluating competing theories as to the balancing of the risk of errors, we must, of
course, keep in mind what those errors are. The possible error with
which we are concerned here is not fact error 4 6 -that is, giving the
plaintiff a verdict when, in fact, the probandum had not occurred (or
vice versa). Rather, we are considering probability error,4 7 balancing the relative risk, on the one hand, of giving the plaintiff a verdict
when the probability of the probandum is actually less than 0.5, and,
on the other hand, of giving the defendant a verdict when the
probability of the verdict is actually greater than 0.5.48
When my choice, 8 E as Kaye labels it, is close to 8 MAP, one might
argue along with Kaye that the societal interest in minimizing such
factfinder errors outweighs the societal interest in equalizing those
errors. When 8 E differs significantly from 8 MAP, however, Kaye's
point can become less attractive. To suggest the extreme situation,
if the method of minimizing the sum of the risks of Type I and Type
II errors is to set one risk at zero while letting the other risk rise, it is
not clear that 8 MAP is a palatable choice.
Cohen, supra note 2, at 417.
Kaye, supra note 1, at 72.
The example Kaye uses to illustrate his theory is inapt, however. In the name of
simplicity, Kaye adds so much information to the mythical case of High-Tech Supply Company v. Hacker that no serious analyst of the case-Bayesian, frequentist, or otherwisecould reach any conclusion other than that the burden of persuasion is satisfied.
As to Kaye's discussion of lie-detector tests, it shares with my thesis the concept of
confidence intervals, but uses them in an entirely different context. The discussion is
interesting but inappropriate to analysis of probabilistic definitions of burdens of persuasion. As such, a response is unnecessary in this article.
46 See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
43
44
45
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Kaye misses this distinction in his statement that "[t]he only nonsuperficial analysis of the civil burden of persuasion that I have seen builds on the premise that in civil
litigation, a false alarm and a miss are equally serious mistakes." Kaye, supra note 1, at
72. Moreover, the statement is an undeservedly harsh assessment of the ideas of other
highly competent scholars. See, e.g., M. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW:
48

STUDIES IN THE APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICAL PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS TO LEGAL

69 (1978). Cf Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L.
REV. 1065, 1072 (1968) ("The assumption [of equal seriousness] is, of course, open to
question. Indeed ... this assumption becomes increasingly dubious.").
PROBLEMS
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For example, assume a class of lawsuits for which, in 40% of the
cases, the probability of plaintiff's case 4 9 exceeds 0.5. Here if the
decision rule were "always give plaintiff the verdict," then a, the risk
of Type I error, would be 0.6, and 13,
the risk of Type II error, would
equal zero. On the other hand, if the decision rule were "always
give defendant the verdict," then a would equal zero, and 13
would
be 0.4. Now assume further that, for this class of lawsuits, the relation between ct and 03 is such that 8 E is satisfied when x = 13
= 0.24,
and that the point at which the sum of ct and 13
is lowest is when ax =
0 and 13= 0.4. If we adopt 8 MAP, then all the errors will be Type II
errors; all verdicts will be for the defendant and all the errors will
result from verdicts that should have been for the plaintiff. If on the
other hand we adopt 8 E, then plaintiffs and defendants will be
equally victimized by errors, and the total number of errors will be
only 20% higher (from ct + 13= 0.4 to a + 13= 0.48).
It is far from clear that a decision rule that brings about error
minimization-but entirely on the backs of the plaintiffs-is preferable here. Accordingly, although Kaye's suggestion of 8MAP is important, more thought is needed before concluding that it is the optimal
solution.
IV
I welcome Kaye's critique of Confidence in Probability, and find
valuable its points concerning both my thesis and its articulation. In
retrospect, however, I wish my article had more effectively communicated its focus on the conceptualization rather than the mathematics of legal decisionmaking, for Kaye's critique does not seriously
address those underlying concepts.
I look forward to continued debate.
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I.e., Pr(liability) IT. See supra note 18.

